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October 24, 1986

HAND DELIVERED
Clerk of the Court
Supreme Court of Utah
332 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Re:

U.R.App.P. 24(j) Citation of Supplemental
Authority in Case No. 20288

To the Office of the Clerk:
Counsel for plaintiff-appellant in Case No. 20288
("Niles") styled as follows:
STEVEN H. BLUM, as guardian ad litem of
SCOTT NILES, a minor and incapacitated
person,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
RODNEY A. STONE, M.D., WESTERN GYNECOLOGICAL AND OBSTETRICAL CLINIC, and
COTTONWOOD
HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER,
jointly and severally,
Defendants and Respondents
hereby cite the following opinion of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Case No. 84-2724
("Hargett"), as a supplemental authority pursuant to Rule
24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

FILED
OCT 2 4 198?
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October 24, 1986
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CHERYL HARGETT, as guardian ad litem for
NATHANIEL HARGETT, a minor,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
CHERYL HARGETT, an individual and WESLEY
HOYT, as guardian ad litem for NATHANIEL
HARGETT, a minor,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DAVID LIMBERG, M.D., an individual,
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC., a Utah
corporation, d/b/a FILLMORE HOSPITAL and
FILLMORE HOSPITAL,
Defendants-Appellees.
Hargett pertains to pages 37-39 of PLAINTIFF'S
BRIEF ON APPEAL in Niles. The reasons for presenting this
supplemental citation are as follows:
1.
In Hargett, the Tenth Circuit decided a
question of statutory construction involving similar facts,
the identical statute and the identical issue now before the
Supreme Court of Utah in Niles;
2. The issue that is common to Hargett and Niles
is whether, given the four-year "savings clause" in U.C.A. §
78-14-4(2), these minor plaintiffs were entitled to have
medical malpractice actions commenced on their behalf as
late as four years after the effective date of the 1979
amendment to the statute of limitations in U.C.A. § 78-14-4,
where said actions were based upon alleged personal injuries
which occurred prior to the effective date of said 1979
amendment;
3. In Hargett at 12-13, the Tenth Circuit held
that the rule in Scott v. School Board of Granite School
District, 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977) "tolled plaintiff's
claim, at least until the 1979 amendment became effective,
and, subsequent to the enactment of the amendment, the
savings clause of § 78-14-4 allowed the filing of
plaintiff's claim" until May 8, 1983; and
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4. In Niles, the following facts are undisputed:
(a) plaintiff's action is based upon alleged personal
injuries which occurred prior to the effective date of
U.C.A. § 78-14-4 as amended in 1979; and (b) plaintiff's
action was commenced prior to May 8, 1983.
A courtesy copy of Hargett is attached hereto for the
convenience of adverse counsel and the Court.
Sincerely,

. C\c^i~*~^
."4.
:don L. Roberts
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed,
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
letter together with a copy of the Opinion of the Tenth
Circuit cited therein, on this ZH — day of October, 1986,
to the following:
Brinton Burbidge, Esq., of and for
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell,
Attorneys for Defendant Hospital
Elliott J. Williams, Esq., of and for
Snow, Christensen & Martineau,
Attorneys for Defendants Stone and
Western Gynecological and Obstetrical
Clinic

c
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Mr, J am e s R. B1a ck,,, Esq.
Mr. Fred R. Silvester Esq
Black & Moore
261 East Broadway, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Re

8A 272 4.; Harpett, et al

vs

- Limburp, et al

Dear Counsel:

theopinion of the Court in the
Enclosed is a copy
^u> <y of
UJ tne
captioned cause. Judgment in accordance with the opinion ha
been entered.
has
Sincerel y yours,
- ^ ^ 7
ROBERT I

HOECKER, Clerk

RLH/lwb
Enclosure
cc: Honorable David K. Winder

330 South 300 Z a t ^ s ^ L i ^ c l l ^ ^ ^
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Plaintiff-Appellant,
CHERYL HARGETT, an individual and
WESLEY HOYT, as guardian ad litem
NATHANIEL HARGETT, a minor,
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No

64-2724
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vs.
DAVID LIMBERG, M.D., an individual,
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC., a Utax.
corporation, d/b/a FILLMORE HOSPITAL
and FILLMORE HOSPITAL,
Defendants-Appellees.
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united States Dist,
.ne District of Utah
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James -.. black (Fred R. Sylvester, Black & Moore
brief), Black & Moore, Salt Lake City, Utah, foappellant.

':th him O1 n the

Dan S. Bushnell (Dav.i s. tlrickson, Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell,
with him -:•- "he briei/ Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, Salt Lake
Cifv. n*-»or defendants-appellees.
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BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.

The medical malpractice claim filed by plaintiff-appellant
Cheryl Hargett was dismissed for failure to file it within the
time allowed by the applicable statute of limitations.
appeals the dismissal on several grounds:

She

(1) the trial court

erred in determining the date she discovered the alleged
malpractice; (2) the failure of the mother to timely file an
action should not bar a minor child from presenting his claim; (3)
the medical malpractice statute of limitations did not bar this
particular claim; (4) the statute of limitations violates the
equal protection provisions of the United States and Utah
constitutions; and (5) the statute of limitations violates the due
process and open courts provisions of the Utah constitution.
Because a determination as to the application of the medical
malpractice statute of limitations in this case adequately
disposes of the appeal, we address that issue only and reverse the
trial court's dismissal of the action.
Nathaniel Hargett, then a 3H month old baby, began having
health problems about February 5, 1979.

On February 12, 1979, his

mother, Cheryl Hargett, telephoned Dr. David Limberg to report
that Nathaniel had a fever, diarrhea and other symptoms.

Limberg

diagnosed the illness as a viral infection.

As the week

progressed, Nathaniel's condition worsened.

Plaintiff took

Nathaniel to the hospital and to Limberg's clinic a number of
times during the week and Limberg examined Nathaniel three or four
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

times*

Limberg reaffirmed his opinion that Nathaniel had a viral

infection that would have to run its course.
By Friday, February 16, 1979, Nathaniel's condition had
deteriorated considerably.

Limberg examined Nathaniel early that

day and sent him home with the same diagnosis.

Plaintiff

telephoned Limberg one or two more times that Friday, and on
Friday night Limberg again told plaintiff that Nathaniel had a
viral infection.
Plaintiff took Nathaniel to the hospital on Saturday morning,
where Limberg saw him.

According to plaintiff, Limberg was short-

tempered and sent her and Nathaniel home.

Plaintiff, believing

that Nathaniel was dying, took the baby to the hospital on
Saturday or Sunday evening.

Limberg arrived shortly thereafter,

examined Nathaniel, and took a blood count and spinal tap.
spinal fluid was cloudy, indicating meningitis.

The

Nathaniel was

then immediately transferred to the care of Dr. Freestone at Utah
Valley Hospital.

Nathaniel was comatose for his first seven days

at Utah Valley Hospital.

After three weeks he was released for a

few days, but was readmitted and remained hospitalized for three
to three and one-half months.
Nathaniel has been diagnosed as presently having
developmental delays, speech and language delays, a hearing
impediment, sensory and neural loss on the left side of his body,
a discrepancy in leg length due to improper muscle growth on his
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left side, and some mental retardation.

Plaintiff alleges that

these conditions are all attributable to the meningitis.
Plaintiff brought this diversity suit in federal court in
Utah individually and as guardian ad litem of Nathaniel on
February 16, 1983.

28 U.S.C. S 1332. She alleged medical

malpractice based on a failure to properly diagnose meningitis.
Limberg moved for dismissal, contending that the suit was barred
by the statute of limitations.

The trial court treated the motion

for dismissal as a summary judgment motion and dismissed the
action.

Plaintiff filed a timely appeal with this court.

28

U.S.C. S 2107.
Because this is a diversity suit, we apply the relevant Utah
statute of limitations, Guaranty Trust Co, v. York, 326 U.S. 99,
108-09 (1945), as well as the applicable Utah tolling provisions.
Cook v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 759 F.2d 800, 802-03 (10th Cir.
1985).

In this case, the relevant statute of limitations is found

in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-1
to 78-14-16 (1986 Supp.), which was passed in 1976 as a response
to the rising number of medical malpractice claims and the
resultant increase in health care costs and reduction in health
care services.

The limitation provision of the Malpractice Act

provides in relevant part:
(1) No malpractice action against a health
care provider may be brought unless it is
commenced within two years after the plaintiff
or patient discovers, or through the use of
reasonable diligence should have discovered
the injury, whichever first occurs, but not to
exceed four years after the date of the
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alleged act, omission, neglect or
occurrence* . . .
*

*

*

(2) The provisions of this section shall
apply to all persons, regardless of minority
or other legal disability under section 78-1236 or any other provision of the law, and
shall apply retroactively to all persons . . .
and to all health care providers and to all
malpractice actions against health care
providers based upon alleged personal injuries
which occurred prior to the effective date of
this act; provided, however, that any action
which under former law could have been
commenced after the effective date of this act
may be commenced only within the unelapsed
portion of time allowed under former law; but
any action which under former law could have
been commenced more than four years after the
effective date of this act may be commenced
only within four years after the effective
date of this act*
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4

(1986 S u p p . ) .

This amended version of §

78-14-4 expressly refers to the Utah general tolling statute, Utah
(1986 Supp.J. 1

Code Ann. S 78-12-36

" ! The following chronology of events will aid in the analysis
of this case:
April 1, 1 9 7 6 — T h e Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, as
originally enacted, becomes effective;
August 16, 1 9 7 7 — T h e Utah Supreme Court renders its
decision in Scott v. School Board of Granite School
District, 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977);
February, 1 9 7 9 — T h e events giving rise to the
malpractice claim in this case occur;
Section 78-12-36 provides in pertinent part:
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for
the recovery of real property, is at the time the cause
of action accrued, either:
(1) Under the age of majority; . . .
*

*

*

The time of such disability is not a part of the time
limited for the commencement of the action.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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May 8, 1979—The amendment to S 78-14-4 becomes
effective;
February 16f 1983—Plaintiff files the malpractice claim
in federal district court.
When the Malpractice Act was originally enacted in 1976, S
78-14-4 did not include the phrase "under section 78-12-36 or any
other provision of the law."

In 1977, the Utah Supreme Court

rendered its decision in Scott v. School Board of Granite School
District, 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977).

In Scott, the court held that

the limitation period on all claims of minors was to be tolled
until the majority of the claimant.

At the time of the alleged

injuries to Nathaniel in February, 1979, the Scott rule tolled the
provisions of S 78-14-4 until Nathaniel reached majority.

The

legislature amended § 78-14-4 in May, 1979, with the intent of
overturning the effect of Scott in the malpractice area.

The

amendment added the reference to § 78-12-36 in order to expressly
include minors' claims within the limitation provision of § 78-144.
Assuming that the amendment precludes the application of the
Scott rule in medical malpractice claims, minors may no longer
invoke the benefits of S 78-12-36.

Although the alleged injuries

to Nathaniel occurred prior to the passage of the amendment to §
78-14-4, plaintiff filed her malpractice claim in February, 1983,
after the amendment to § 78-14-4 became effective.

Appellees thus

contend that the limitation provisions of the statute bar the
filing of plaintiff's claim.

Plaintiff asserts that the amended

version of § 78-14-4 should not apply to this injury which
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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occurred prior to the effective date of the amendment.
Alternatively, plaintiff contends that even if the amendment is
applied in this case, the saving provision of S 78-14-4(2) allows
the filing of the claim.
The Utah Supreme Court rendered its decision in Scott in
1977, subsequent to the passing of the original Malpractice Act.
Plaintiff contends that the Scott decision required the
application of the general tolling provisions in all minors1
claims, including medical malpractice claims.

Appellees, on the

other hand, assert that Scott should not be read so broadly, and
that its application should be limited to the particular facts of
Scott involving the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
The Scott decision dealt with the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act, and therefore did not specifically address the limitation
provision of the Malpractice Act.

Nevertheless, the Utah court

unequivocally stated that "a minor claimant is justly entitled to
the protection afforded by said Section 78-12-36(1), U.C.A., 1953,
in all cases, including notice requirements of the type contained
in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

To hold otherwise is a

denial of due process and equal protection."
748 (emphasis added).

Scott, 568 P.2d at

The Utah court based its ruling on the

"abundantly clear" general legislative intent to protect the
claims of minors. Id.
In Scott, the court noted that its previous decisions had
held that the various specific statutes of limitation took
precedence over the general tolling statute, but that the general
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tolling provisions would now apply in all cases involving minors
• (notwithstanding the prior pronouncements of this court."
Scott, 568 P.2d at 747-48.

Also/ the language in Scott providing

that S 78-12-36(1) applied "in all cases, including notice
requirements of the type contained in the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act" indicates that the court intended its holding to
2
have application beyond the facts present in Scott,
Scott, 568
P.2d at 748 (emphasis added).

The Utah court could have narrowed

its holding or carved out specific exceptions to the broad
application of the tolling provision, yet it chose not to do so.
Thus, pursuant to Scott, the general tolling provisions of § 7812-36 would apply to all claims of minors, including medical
malpractice claims, and the limitation provisions of § 78-14-4
would be tolled until Nathaniel reached majority.
The Utah Legislature apparently recognized the possibility
that Scott would allow the tolling of § 78-14-4 until the majority
of the minor claimant, and endeavored to preclude such an
application of Scott.

In 1979, the legislature amended § 78-14-4

to include the phrase "under section 78-12-36 or any other
provision of the law" in order to include minors1 claims in the
limitation provisions of S 78-14-4.

The express purpose of the

amendment was "to overturn a Supreme Court decision which has

The Utah court has in fact expressly used the reasoning of
Scott to toll the statute of limitations in an area wholly
separate from the Governmental Immunity Act; the area of paternity
and child support actions under the Utah Uniform Paternity Act.
See Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Utah 1981).

-8-
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recently come down,"

Representative Judd,

Transcript of

Discussion and Vote in Utah House,of Representatives at Third
Reading of B.B. 164 (Feb. 13, 1979).

Both parties concede that

the Supreme Court decision referred to above is the Scott
decision.

(Appellantfs brief at 19, Appellees' brief at 17). The

1979 amendment was passed by the Utah Legislature during the
session which adjourned March 8, 1979.

Because Utah acts take

effect 60 days after adjournment of a session, the 1979 amendment
became effective on May 8, 1979.

Utah Const., Art. VI, § 25. See

also Utah Code Ann., Parallel Tables Volume, pp. 80, 85 (1986
Supp.).
The appellees claim that this amendment precludes the
possibility of tolling and is to be applied retroactively, thus
barring plaintiff's claim.

Even if we assume that the amendment

does effectively preclude the application of § 78-12-36 to medical
malpractice claims and that it may be applied to plaintiff's
claim, S 78-14-4 does not operate to bar this action.
Utah law generally calls for the application of the law which
is in effect as of the date of the filing of the original

Representative Judd also stated:
However, as with any good law, sometimes it needs to be
interpreted by the Court before you really know whether
or not you have done what you have wanted to do and so
the original bill has now been interpreted by the Court
and its impact has been felt in another area of the law.
And as a result of that, we come to you now with the
amendment which suggests that, despite what it says in
178-14-4] it does not impact [78-12-36] which is another
area of the statute of limitations, and so we are making
that change in order to overturn a Supreme Court
decision which has recently come down.

-v
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complaint.
(Utah 1964).

Archer v. Utah State Land Board. 392 P.2d 622, 624
£>ee also Marshall v. Industrial Commission of State

of Utah, 704 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1985).

Section 78-14-4, as

amended, was in effect at the date of filing and, therefore, we
apply it to this action.

However, even when we apply § 78-14-4,

as amended, to the occurrences which form the basis of this case,
it does not bar plaintiff's claim.

The saving clause in S 78-14-

4(2) allows a claimant whose claim has accrued prior to the
effective date of the Act to commence his suit within the time
remaining under the limitation period that was applicable to such
claimant before the Malpractice Act became effective.

These

accrued claims must be commenced no later than four years from the
effective date of the Act.
Appellees argue that the effective date of the Act is April
1, 1976, and that the saving provision of § 78-14-4(2) only allows
the commencement of accrued actions through April 1, 1980.
Appellees also contend that the substance and effect of the 1979
amendment should relate back to the effective date of the original
Act, with no break in continuity between the enactment date of the
original Act and the amendment.

To accept this argument would be

to ignore the effect of the Scott ruling subsequent to the passing
of the original Act, as well as the established limitations on the
power of the legislature.
As noted above, the Scott decision permitted the tolling of
the limitation period for a minor's cause of action until that
minor reached the age of majority.

.iU-

The Scott rule applied to all
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claims involving minors, including medical malpractice claims, at
least until the/legislature amended the Malpractice Act in 1979.
Thus, prior to the 1979 amendment, Utah law required the tolling
of the limitation period set forth in S 78-14-4 until the minor
claimant reached majority.
The 1979 amendment is a legislative attempt to overturn the
Scott decision, and, assuming the amendment successfully achieved
that purpose, constitutes a clear change in Utah law.

While Utah

law, ^under appropriate circumstances, will allow the enactment of
a statute that "has a reasonable retrospective application upon
matters or actions prior to its enactment or prior to [the
legislature's] convening," it will not allow the legislature to
"pass an act which would become a law prior to the date it was
duly convened."

Mecham v. State Tax Commission, 410 P.2d 1008,

1009 (Utah 1966)(holding that the effective date of an amendment
to the Utah income tax statutes was 60 days after the adjournment
of the legislature, or May 11, 1965, although the act had
retroactive effect back to January 1, 1965).
To allow the effective date of the amended version of § 7814-4 to,relate back to the original Act's effective date of April
1, 1976, as appellees urge, would allow the enactment of a law
prior.,to the date the legislature convened to consider the law,
and is,forbidden by Mecham.

Such a construction would also

completely igncre the intervening existence of the Scott decision
as the compelling reason behind the 1979 amendment.

Thus, the

change in Utah law did not become effective until the enactment of

-11-
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the 1979 amenamenti and to the extent S 78-14-4, as amended,
overturns scott and prevents the application of the general
tolling provisions of S 78-12-36, the effective date of the Act is
May 8, 1979.
Applying this effective date of May 8, 1979, to the saving
clause in § 78-14-4(2), it becomes clear that this case
constitutes a malpractice action "based upon alleged personal
injuries which occurred prior to the effective date of this act."
Furthermore, under "former law," or the law in effect prior to the
effective date of the Act (in this case Scott), plaintiff's claim
could have been commenced after Nathaniel reached majority, well
after the effective date of the Act.

Pursuant to S 78-14-4(2),

plaintiff is given the unelapsed portion of the time allowed under
Scott to bring the claim.

However, since this unelapsed portion

of time would allow plaintiff to bring the claim more than four
years after the effective date of the Act, plaintiff is given up
to four years from the effective date to commence the action.
Thus, plaintiff had until May 8, 1983, to file the malpractice
suit.

The original complaint was filed February 16, 1983, and

therefore is not barred by the statute of limitations.
In summary, we hold the Scott rule tolled plaintiff's claim,
at least until the 1979 amendment became effective, and,
subsequent to the enactment of the amendment, the saving clause of
S 78-14-4 allowed the filing of plaintiff's claim.

This

determination renders moot the issues as to when plaintiff
actually discovered the injury and whether the mother's failure to
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bring a timely claim should also bar the child from filing suit.
Furthermore, we express no opinion as to whether the 1979
amendment did in fact successfully overturn Scottt whether the
amendment may properly be given retroactive effect, or whether the
limitation statute violates the United States and Utah
constitutions.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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